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ABSTRACT
Software safety is the subject of a research project in its
initial stages at the University of California Irvine. This
research deals with critical real-time software where the
cost of an error is high,, e.g. human life. In this paper
software techniques having a bearing on safety are described
and evaluated. Initial definitions of software safety
concepts are presented along with some preliminary thoughts
and research questions.
Software Safety; A Definition and
Some Preliminary Thoughts
Nancy G,. Leveson
Information and Computer Science
University of California, Irvine
Reliability has been the subject of research since the
early days of computers. Although much progress has been
made in this area, at the same time the complexity of
computerized systems and applications has increased
dramatically. Since errors and complexity are intimately
related, the problems with which reliability techniques have
had to cope have also been increasing with time, and,
unfortunately, techniques to handle errors have not kept up
with the increasing possibilities for introducing them.
The problem of reliability becomes even more aggravated
as computer applications increasingly include areas where
the consequences of failure are serious and may include loss
of life and property. Examples of such applications are
aircraft flight and traffic control, nuclear power plants,
monitoring of critically ill patients at hospitals, weapons
and defense systems, and manned space flights. With the
advent of computer usage in these critical real-time
applications, a new dimension was introduced into
reliability — the cost of errors. When the cost of an
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error is high^ for example a human life, not only do
reliability factors start to take precedence over other
quality factors on which software and hardware can be
judged, but techniques which may have been cost prohibitive
suddenly become more practical. It will be argued herein
that software safety is a distinct facet of software quality
and, because of its inherent severe cost factors, needs to
be considered as a separate and important measure of system
quality.
In this paper, the problem of software safety will be
examined and a research plan outlined. First the problem of
errors will be discussed and extant reliability techniques
with a bearing on safety described and evaluated; Then an
initial definition of software safety will be outlined and
some preliminary thoughts and research directions presented.
Errors
Errors can be divided into two types — those which
arise from hardware failure and those which originate in
software. Although a hardware error may result in- a
software error , or in detection and handling through
software, the definition of software errors will be limited
to errors in software specification, design, and coding.
The distinction can get cloudy. For example, a hardware
error such as bad input data caused by a faulty input device
may ultimately lead to a failure of a software routine.
Page 3
Although admittedly somewhat arbitrarythis type of error
v/ill be classified for our purposes as a hardware error, A
legal but unexpected input which leads to a failure will be
classified as a software error. The distinction is made not
on the basis of where the error should be handled (which in
many cases could be either hardware or software)? but rather
as to where the error originated and what would have to be
fixed to eliminate it. In the case of a faulty input
device, the repair of the input device would be warranted.
In the case of. a legal but unexpected or unusual input, the
software would be modified.
The problems of hardware errors and hardware
fault-tolerance has been widely studied [for a good summary
see AVI75], and computer systems which tolerate hardware
component failure can be constructed by introducing
redundancy. However, less progress has been made toward the
problem of dealing with design errors. Until recently, the
design of hardware has been relatively simple, and it has
been possible to detect errors through comprehensive
testing. With the advent of VLSI, however, this fortunate
situation may soon be changed.
Most of the complexity in systems has been incorporated
in the software where comprehensive testing is not possible
for large systems. Thus most of the reliability problems in
computing systems can be traced to software design
errors [20] . This research will focus primarily on software
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errors. In practice, of course, the goal is a reliable
computing system which is free from or can tolerate all
errors hardware and software, a combination of the
techniques for hardware and software reliability may help
meet this goal.
Software errors have been regarded as a temporary
problem. It seems to be widely felt that as soon as
adequate methodologies for program development and
validation can be devised, software errors will no longer be
a problem. But progress in developing these methodologies
has been slow, and error-free software may not be a
realistic goal. Since human programmers are not infallible,
it is unlikely that we will be able to construct large
error-free systems until automatic program synthesis becomes
a reality. Even automatic programming may not be the
panacea we seek. Errors are made in all stages of program
production. There is evidence that more errors occur during
the requirements and design stage (over 60%) than during
coding (less than 20%) [LIP79].
Errors caused by human mistakes can be introduced at^
any stage of the software life-cycle. The requirements
specification may be incomplete or ambiguous; the system
design may not adequately implement the requirements either
through misinterpretation or errors in specifying
interactions among the parts of the system; programmers may
misinterpret the design specification; and so on.
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Furthermore^ critical real-time software may have additional
requirements not found in other systems which add to the
complexity of the resulting software (and hence the
potential for error). For example, there may be a time
limit on the execution of the program, i.e. output may be
required within a few milliseconds after the input stimuli.
This precludes the use of many techniques for error handling
which are used in situations where accuracy is just as
important, e.g. accounting systems, but where time is not
so severly constrained.
Software reliability techniques may be divided into
four categoriesj 1) techniques to prevent or eliminate
errors while the system is under development, 2) techniques
to test and validate software after it is written but before
the system goes into production, 3) techniques to model and
measure reliability, and 4) techniques to cope with residual
design flaws, coding bugs, hardiv'are errors, and user errors
after the system has been validated. The first two
techniques involve primarily program development, the third
measurement, and the fourth what is known as software fault
tolerance.
Pr_o,gxam Development
Although development techniques are often separated
from validation, there is a danger is doing so. Parnas
[PAR77] has said that no methodology is useful unless it
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includes a means for recording intermediate design decisions
for verifying the correctness of each of these
decisions. The usual diagram of the software lifecycle is
misleading and unfortunate in including testing and
validation in a step after coding. Since it is widely
recognized that the earlier errors are caught^ the easier
they are to fix [LIP79], a test and verification step should
be included in the diagram after each step of the cycle. In
order to emphasize this point, in this paper program
development techniques will be separated into those which
attempt to prevent the inclusion of errors and those which
attempt to locate and eliminate the errors which have
already been included.
^PP^^o^ches which attempt to encourage error—free
construction of software systems include top-down design and
other design techniques and tools, structured programming,
formal specification methods and tools, programming
standards, and project organization and management
techniques. Although there is great concensus that these
techniques do produce "better" software, they must be used
by humans and humans are fallible. There are even the
designers and programmers that Parnas has called the
"methodology invariant" for whom no methodology will be
helpful. Therefore, software will contain errors for some
time to come.
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Validation methods attempt to find errors after they
have been included in the system and, hopefully, to
eliminate them. These methods include the use of program
debugging and debugging tools, verification of formal
specifications, design reviews and walkthroughs, testing
methods and automated testing tools, and techniques for
proving program correctness.
Validation methods present some serious problems in
assuring reliable software which will probably not be
relieved by devising better procedures. First, for large
systems, exhaustive testing of all possible cases is
impossible. Furthermore, the process of designing test data
is difficult and is itself subject to error. Also, there is
no way to determine when testing or review is complete.
Reliability estimates are used for this purpose, but at
present are far from reliable themselves.
Formal proof techniques are an attempt to remedy some
of the limitations of testing. Even assuming that
mechanical verification systems were available and usable
and that cost was unimportant, a formal proof only
demonstrates the correctness of the program with respect to
the specifications. There is no guarantee that the
specifications are correct, and, in fact, writing formal
specifications is a difficult and error-prone process
[GER76], Furthermore, the complexity of proving a large
system correct is so great that the process must itself be
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error-prone.
But the greatest limitation of validation techniques is
that they cannot guard against imperfect execution
environments. A program can only be validated for given
environmental assumptions. Software errors may be caused by
undetected hardware errors such as transient faults causing
mutilation of data, security violations, human mistakes
during operation and maintenance, errors in underlying or
supporting software systems, or interfacing problems with
other systems such as timing errors. Just as all correct
paths through a program cannot be tested for a complex
system,•neither can all environmental conditions.
Reliabilitv Modelling aM
Most of the techniques for modelling or measuring, the
reliability of software have been adapted from techniques
originally devised for hardware modelling. The basic
approach is to rate the reliability of a software system by
estimating the number of errors in the system [SW78]. The
applicability of these hardware techniques to software has
been questioned, and this issue will be covered in a later
paper.
Other techniques specific to software for measuring
reliability have been proposed. The basic assumption is
that reliability is inversely proportional to program
complexity. Three types of complexity measurements have
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been proposed [RAU]% 1) textual complexity based on a
static analysis of program text (e^g, the number of
operators and operands)^ 2) structural complexity based on
static analysis of program graphs (e,go a count of decision
instructions in the program)f and 3) structual complexity
based on execution behavior (Oog. the number of program
paths)c The applicability of these measures to reliability
is unproven.
Software Fault
The methods described above have the common goal of
eliminating errors prior to the operational use of the
software system., As argued abovej, however^ removal of all
errors and perfect execution in imperfect environments
cannot at this point in time^ and probably never will, be
guaranteed using these methods» For this reason, software
fault tolerance is a necessity in real-time critical
systems„ The software fault tolerance approach assumes that
errors will occur and attempts to increase reliability by
ensuring that the software will continue to function
successfully in spite of the presence of errors.
Most sophisticated software systems include facilities
for dealing with errors that are detected at run-time, Ocg.
input editing, auditing, and logging facilities in data
processing applications, integrity checking and recovery in
data base management systems, and exception-handling and
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checkpointing facilities in operating systems. In
environments requiring continuous service, e.g. operating
systems, telephone switching systems, and space flight
systems, sophisticated ad hoc facilities have provided a
large measure of protection from hardware failures as well
as from some software errors. These techniques are,
however, ad hoc, and the aim of research in software fault
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tolerance has been to propose and evaluate methodological
approaches.
In general, run-time error facilities have three
aspects: 1) error detection, 2) limitation of damage caused
by the failure, and 3) recovery.
Error detection has been widely studied and practiced
in both software and hardware. Most hardware techniques
involve redundancy —• component redundancy such as voting
systems or redundant information such as parity or Hamming
codes. Detection facilities in software also use
"component" or activity redundancy and redundant
information. Activity redundancy may take the form of
replicating some activity to check the results or perhaps
reversal of the activity to calculate what the input should
have been. An example of redundant information might be
some extra information kept about data structures. Software
detection facilities may also include other types of checks
such as as reasonableness checks and interface checks (i.e.
checking the interactions across interfaces),
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Damage confinement has been studied extensively with
respect to operating systems. Techniques depend upon
constraints on information flow in the system and are known
as protection mechanisms. Once damage has occurred, in
order to recover there must be some way to undo the side
effects of erroneous operations.
Information redundancy is used to reconstruct damaged
data and may be in the form of backup copies or redundancy
in the representation of the data, Taylor, Morgan, and
Black [TMB80] have investigated the use of redundancy in
data structures to detect and recover from errors. There
are three drawbacks to this approach. First, redundant
information increases the complexity of the data structure
and of update routines and, in turn, the increased
complexity may itsqlf lead to errors. Also, correct update
routines may propagate erroneous changes, Taylor et.al,
have shown that in many highly redundant structures, the
rate of error propagation is directly proportional to the
detectability. Finally, erroneous changes may be made to
multiple fields which may limit the ability to detect error
through inconsistency.
An alternative to structural redundancy is to keep
backup copies. Either complete checkpoints may be taken
frequently or, alternatively, backup copies made
infrequently and only changes recorded between checkpoints,
Randell's "recovery cache" mechanism [RAN75] involves making
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backup copies at the entry to each block. Sophisticated
techniques for checkpointing are used in data base and data
processing systems. The drawbacks to backup redundancy
include cost, the time needed to reprocess transactions
against the data, and the possibility of propagation of
errors. However, backup redundancy is probably more
practical than structural redundancy because of the
simplicity of implementation and the reliability of recovery
without error. Not only can errors be introduced in the
added software needed to process the redundant information
in the data structure, but there is no guarantee that errors
can be undone using structural redundancy.
Once an error is detected, measures must be taken to
deal with it. Software recovery techniques have usually
involved exception handling facilities. Every complex
system can be viewed as being composed of multiple levels of
abstraction. The primary goal of exception handling is to
make the failure transparent to higher levels. Barring
this, the system should be put in a consistent state so that
recovery is possible. The failure is then reported to a
highpr level which can initiate "intelligent" error-handling
action and, hopefully, make the failure transparent to even
highpr levels (including the user of the system).
I
Exception handling has three purposes [G0075]. The
first is to deal with an operation's impending or actual
failure. Goodenough has noted that there are two types of
Page 13
failures — range failure and domain failure. A range
failure occurs when an operation is unable to satisfy its
output assertion^ i.e. its criterion for determining
whether it has produced a valid result. On the other hand,
a domain failure occurs when an operation's inputs fail to
pass certain acceptance tests, i.e. the input assertion. A
second use for exception handling is to indicate the
significance of a valid result or the circumstances under
which the result was obtained. Exception handling may also
be used to allow the invoker to monitor an operation, e.g.
to measure computational progress or to provide additional
information and guidance in the event that certain
conditions should arise. Exception handling procedures have
been described extensively in the literature [see for
example G0075, WAS78, LS79].
Some hardware experts have argued against using
exception-handling to recover from errors and instead have
proposed applying standard hardware techniques to software
[RAN79, MSR7.5, AVI75] . The result has been called "software
fault tolerance."
All hardware fault tolerance is based on the use of
redundancy, both for error detection and recovery. This
redundancy may be special (concurrent execution of multiple
copies) or temporal (consecutive execution of the same
component). Hardware errors may be classified as either
permanent or transient. Permanent errors are usually due to
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some kind of "aging" process, and spatial redundancy is
sufficient to recover. Diagnosis of the error will not help
except in ultimately repairing the component. Transient
errors, also caused by aging or by some external event (e.g.
power surges) may be handled with either spatial or temporal
redundancy.
Proponents of the software fault tolerance approach
such as Randell [RAN75, RAN79] have argued that hardware
techniques should be directly adapted to software and that
no attempts should be made to diagnose the particular fault
that caused an error or to assess the extent of any other
damage the fault may have caused, i.e. exception handling
is inappropriate for handling design errors. Recovery
actions need merely to return the system to a prior state
(hopefully one which precedes the error), and then go
forward again with an alternate piece of code.
But one should not be too hasty in accepting this
conclusion. Many large software systems are much more
complex than hardware systems, and the underlying
assumptions about causes of errors are different in software
and hardware. Software errors are usually errors of design.
More sophisticated types of facilities which take advantage
of the algorithmic power of software may be necessary to
detect and recover from software design errors than the
relatively simpler errors which occur in hardware. Much
more justification and study is needed before it is possible
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to say with certainty that hardware techniques are
appropriate for software.
Two approaches based on hardware fault tolerance have
been proposed — n-version programming and the recovery
block.
In n-version programming, multiple versions of an
algorithm are executed simultaneously and the results
compared. If the results differ, voting or other strategies
can be used to select one result [ELM72, CA78], In
hardware, since failure is due to fatigue, modular
redundancy with voting circuits can greatly increase
reliability. In softvyare, however, multiple versions of
algorithms that contain design errors does not increase
reliability. The success of this approach then is dependent
upon the complete independence of the n versions. This
implies the use of different algorithms, programming
languages, and support systems. Since a large percentage of
errors can be traced back to incomplete, inconsistent, or
ambiguous requirements specifications, independent
development must start at the requirements specification
stage, A further requirement for an n-version system is m
computers (where m is greater than or equal to n) that are
hardware independent yet able to communicate efficiently for
rapid comparison of results.
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Dual (2-version) programming has been tried in two
European projects. Swedish State Railways has a point
switching, signal control, and traffic control system in the
Gothenburg area which uses redundant programmning [TAY81],
If two programs show different results, signal lights are
switched to red. A nuclear reactor project was jointly
developed in Finland and Norway using dual programming
[RAM]. There were two implementation approaches and two
programming languages in two different countries, a common
specification was used, however, and two different
interpretations of the specification resulted although the
discrepancies were found prior to implementation. European
experience seems to indicate common errors in about half of
the redundant software systems developed to date [TAY81]
A second method of providing software tolerance uses
recovery blocks [RAN75]. A recovery block consists of a
regular programming language, block (called the primary
block), an acceptance test, and a sequence of alternate
blocks.
A: ensure <acceptance test>
ijy <primary block >
£ii£ to <alternate block>
else too*.
The acceptance test is a logical expression which is
evaluated to determine if the result of a block is correct.
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If a primary or alternate block does not complete (because
of an error or expiration of time limit) or fails the
acceptance test^ the state is restored to just prior to
entering the recovery block, and the next alternate (if
there is one) is enteredo If all alternates fail to pass
; the acceptance test, recovery is attempted at the level of
the next enclosing recovery block® If the acceptance test
is passed, control passes to the statement after the
recovery block. Prior states to be used for rollback are
stored in a "recovery cache."
Although experience with recovery blocks is limited,
alternate modules have been used, in an ad hoc manner, in
space applications [HEC75].
An advantage of the recovery block is its simple
. control structure. Also, the alternates need not be
- identical to the primary block. In some cases, there may be
alternate algorithms for achieving the same ends, perhaps
some more "desirable" than others. There may also be a fast
, heuristic which usually works which can be backed up by
slower but always correct algorithms. Finally, in systems
i undergoing maintenance, further errors are sometimes
introduced in the maintenance process. Sometimes it is
"i
possible to keep an older (and perhaps more robust) version
•; as a backup routine.
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Randell has described some of the problems of the.
recovery block technique. Restoring the state before
switching to an alternate may be difficult to implement
efficiently and may require hardware aids. Also,
structuring systems of communicating processes adds
complications. Restoring the state of one process may
require that other processes with which it has communicated
restore their states, thus creating a "domino effect."
There are further drawbacks in applying recovery blocks
to real-time critical systems. Time requirements may be
such that switching to an alternate routine and starting
again means that results will arrive too late to be useful.
And in some situations backup to a prior state may be
impossible. This is the "please ignore approaching torpedo"
problem.
Table I summarizes the important differences between
n-version programming and recovery blocks.
n-versiori recovery block
calculations same different possible
execution parallel successive
error-detection voting schemes acceptance test
Table I
Page 19
The relative advantages of exception handling vs,
hardware-oriented approaches for software fault tolerance is
an open question^ Exception handling research has been the
more general of the two in that it has included attempts to
predict and deal with anticipated or likely faults along
with fault diagnosis and damage assessment. The software
fault tolerance approach? on the other hand? has borrowed
hardware fault tolerance techniques where diagnosis and
damage assessment is not important for recovery? and
anticipated and unanticipated errors are dealt with in the
same fashion.
Now that reliability and reliability techniques have
been described? it is possible to define software safety and
to differentiate it from reliability. There does not seem
to be any formal definition of software safety in the
literature so the first step in the project will be to
attempt a definition.
To define safety? it is necessary to first define some
common terms in reliability such as "failure?" "error?" and
"fault," Generally? a failure is said to have occurred when
the behavior of a system deviates from its specifications.
Reliability is a measure of the success with which a system
comforms to some specification of its behavior. Although
the terms error and fault are used differently in the
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hardware and software literature, the IEEE terminology task
group has suggested that an error be defined as a causative
agent and a fault as a symptom or manisfestation of an error
[LIP79]. While in hardware errors are caused by fatigue and
may appear in previously error-free components, all software
errors can be traced back to human error and are present
from the inception of the Software object (except for errors
added during maintenance).. However, the concept of "chain
of effects" is useful in relation to software errors since
one error may lead to another error, e.g. an error in an
algorithm may lead to an error in a state.
One is first tempted to define safety as reliability.
It is true that a more reliable system is usually safer than
a less reliable system. Obviously they are closely related,
but differences do exist. First, the goals of the two are
different. The goal of reliability is lack of unintended
function. The goal of safety is lack of unsafe operation.
A system may perform in an unintended manner but still not
result in unsafe operation.
A second difference is that reliability is concerned
with failures. Safety is concerned with the consequence of
failures in terms of economic or human cost. Some failures
are more serious than others, and, in turn, this implies
that some errors are more serious than others. Reliability
theory currently tries to quantify errors, safety implies
that errors must be qualified. The necessity for some kind
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of penalty cost analysis in reliability has been noted by
Littlewood [LIT80] and Cheung [CHE80]. But so far,
reliability models simply count failures which, in effect,
gives the same cost to eachs
Finally, it is important to separate reliability and
safety because, in some cases, these may actually be
conflicting goals, and proper decision making will require
knowledge of this fact. Safety procedures in a weapons
system may involve disabling the detonation facilities of
the weapon. In the absurd case, disabling or shutdown could
always occur after firing. This would make the weapon
system 100% safe but 0% reliable. In other more realistic
circumstances, an error may be detected and a decision may
need to be made as to whether to switch to backup safety
procedures or to try to fix the error. Attempting to fix
the error would result in increased probability of intended
function but perhaps also might result in decreased safety
(e.g. if recovery is attempted, there may no longer be a
guarantee that enough time will be left to successfully
implement safety procedures). Decision making here will
involve questions of morality, politics, etc. which must be
examined by those equipped to do so. But the important
point is that less information is available to make these
decisions if safety and reliability are lumped together in
one measure.
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A safety gaj:Xuye (commonly termed a mishap in system
safety) will be defined as a failure which leads to
casualties or serious consequences. The definition of
serious consequences will have to be left up to the system
designer. It obviously includes injury or death. It may
also include the destruction of property or any other
undesirable consequence the avoidance of which the designer
of the system considers as or more important than the
correct operation of the system. In some cases, such as
software for manned space craft, nearly every failure may be
a safety failure. An example of a non-critical failure
might be a failure in an archival routine intended only to
provide data for post-mission analysis.
An unsafe state will be defined as one for which there
are circumstances where further processing will lead to a
safety failure which we do not attribute to a subsequent
error, A svstem will be defined as one which prevents
unsafe states from producing safety failures.
Reliable software has had two distinct meanings
[YEH76]. Most often, software reliability is equated with
correctness. A system is correct if it meets its intended
function. This implies that the specifications are
satisfied, e.g. the input and the environment in which the
software runs meet the requirements of the specifications.
Attempts to make software fault-tolerant have involved the
quality of robustness. Software is robust if it can
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continue to give adequate service even when faced with
unspecified or unexpected circumstances (e.g. hardware
failure, bad data, or software error). Another quality with
which software can be judged, safety, is being proposed. It
is distinct from both correctness and robustness although
obviously related to both. One goal of this research is to
clarify this relationship. The difference between
correctness (the standard meaning for reliability) and
safety has been discussed. It remains to try to
differentiate between fault-tolerance and safety.
In the hardware field, a f ault-tolera-Kt. computing
system is one which carries out its program correctly in the
presence of operational faults. Thus the aim of
fault-tolerance is to continue to provide full performance
and functional capabilities. The goal of
procedures (also called partial fault tolerance or graceful
degradation) is to continue operation but to provide only
degraded performance or reduced functional capabilities
until the fault is removed. The goal of
procedures is to limit the amount of damage caused by a
fault. No attempt is made to satisfy the functional
specifications except where this is necessary to ensure
safety.
In some critical real-time software, e.g. that in the
space industry, a fault-tolerant position is taken -- a
system either works or it does not, and failure of a
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critical system is intolerable. In other situations, e.g.
a patient monitoring system, fail-soft procedures may
suffice. In weapons systems, fail-safe procedures may be
the most realistic. Most systems take only one view. But
in some large, complex systems, these procedures might be
used to interface with each other (fail-safe or fail-soft
procedures to back up fault-tolerant procedures in event of
their failure). Also, one of these procedures might be
appropriate for one part of the system while a different
procedure might be appropriate in another part.
In summary the following working definitions will be
used;
failure - when a system fails to deliver "expected
behavior."
gafety failure - a failure which lead to casualties
or serious consequences, A serious consequence
is any undesirable event which the designer
considers to be as or more important than the
correct (reliable) operation of the system.
safetv - a measure of the ability of the system to
avoid safety failures.
yngaf? state - one for which there are circumstances
where further processing will lead to a safety
failure.
safe S.ygtiffin - one which prevents unsafe states from
causing safety failures,
system - a system which limits the amount
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of damage caused by a fault. No attempt is
made to satisfy the functional specifications
except where necessary to ensure safety.
Preliminary Thougjifca
Starting with the definition of software safety and
related terms given above, the goals of the project are to
examine the following questions and preliminary ideas.
I
1) Design CQPg^^^erations.
-- Can safety techniques be classified? For example,
sometimes shutdown of components which might cause harm
(reconfiguration) is appropriate while in other situations
something must be done to avoid harm (ditch rocket in ocean
or blow it up in midair).
Is it possible to design so that critical and
non-critical functions are separate and the system is
reconfigurable? Some errors in non-critical functions will
not affect overall safety, e.g. bad computation, but some
will (e.g. infinite loop, hardware failure) and perhaps it
is necessary to terminate execution of non-critical
sections, A "supervisor" might be used to control execution
so that unsafe but non-critical modules can be avoided.
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- Critical modules from a reliability viewpoint may
not be those from a safety viewpoint. The user-oriented
reliability model [CHE80] indicates that the program modules
used most often during execution time probably are the
^^itical modules from a reliability point of view. Is it
possible to identify critical modules from a safety point of
view? If so, how?
j ~ Where should fault—tolerance be used and where
fail-soft or fail-safe procedures? Because of the high cost
of completei software faiilt-tolerance, it will be desirable
' 1 ' • ' i ' I ' 'to^ £)potect non-critical modules only to the ^xbeht that
faults in their execution do not impact the critical
functions.
Is it possible to provide a "safety kernel?" The
kernel approach has been used successfully in operating
systems, e.g, a security kernel. The kernel might be used
to organize recovery in other segments and/or might contain
critical functions.
Is there one methodology and structure to handle
both anticipated and unanticipated errors and to handle
fault-tolerance, fail-soft, and fail-safe?
Critical modules should be independent of other
modules, the structures simple and elegant, and efficiency
sacrificed if necessary. Are there critical and
non-critical errors within critical modules?
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—How will fail-safe measures be made fail-safe?
Perhaps by extra testing or proof of correctness? Does the
addition of fault-tolerance, fail-soft, or fail-safe
procedures add to the complexity of the system and thus
reduce its reliability and safety? Who checks the error
checking? What happens when an error occurs in an error
checking mechanism?
•— Is there some design or system structuring technique
such as state transition diagrams denoting illegal
transitions which would be helpful?
•— Upon detection of an error, is it possible to place
the system in a consistent state so that no damage will be
done independent of whether the error is repaired or not and
then try to repair it instead of vice versa?
—What facilities can be put into the program and what
into the interpreter or underlying system? In other words,
what is the appropriate level(s) for handling safety?
Usually one tries to design so that error detection and
handling at one level is invisible at the earliest possible
higher level. Does this apply with safety?
—Are the protection mechanisms of operating systems
(or something like them) applicable for preventing a failure
in non-critical functions from interfering with critical
functions?
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~ Are there architectures, e.g, data flow, which
might be superior for safety? What about functional
programming languages where there are no side effects to
undo for backup? What extensions to programming languages
(e.g. Ada) are necessary to handle safety requirements?
—Is it possible or necessary to locate the original
error so that it can be avoided? The detection of an
erroneous state does not necessarily identify the cause of
the error.
—Damage assessment is the procedure which determines
the extent of damage in the case of an error. How can one
tell if a state is unsafe or merely erroneous? Must this be
based oh a priori reasoning? Or can the system itself help
by means of exploratory procedures?
2) Devg3iQpment CQnsi<aeyati<?n9
—What development procedures will lead to systems
which are safe? It appears that it is necessary to v^ork
toward safety during the entire 3-ife cycle.
—The requirements specification should include safety
requirements and , an analysis of possible types of errors.
Is there anything else? How should this be done? >,
•— Perhaps a new attitude is necessary in design and
coding, that is, to sssume errors will exist and to cpnsider
while designing and programming how to recover from these
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errors, A proof-guided methodology might be devised for
designing safety procedures. Can safety requirements be
traced through coding?
Are n-version programming or recovery blocks
appropriate for safety? In n-version programming^ how can
independence be ensured? Perhaps it is not necessary to
replicate the entire system. In SIFT [CAR79], most critical
functions are assigned to several modules while less
critical tasks are placed in a lesser number of modules,
— In testing and validation^ how much of the available
resources should be put into critical functions and safety
techniques? How much into correctness? Robustness? Safety
features should be thoroughly tested. Diagnostic tests
which deliberately violate requirement or design
specifications are important. Is it possible to specify
procedures for accomplishing this? Are proof of
correctness^ exhautive testing, or stricter acceptance tests
appropriate for safety critical modules?
-- In maintenance it may be possible to indicate
modifications which may have a traumatic effect on the
safety of the system and to avoid as much as possible
modifying safety critical modules when considering
maintenance alternatives (although this should not preclude
modifications which will improve safety),
3)Applicability fif hardware
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;
The basic assumptions in hardware reliability
include; a component is correct before a fault? most
errors are caused by fatigue, not design; individual copies
of components are independent; it is much more important to
be able to recover from errors than to prevent them. What
relationship do these hardware assumptions have to software?
Can error detection techniques and rollback provisions be
I
adapted to software failures?
—Redundancy guarantees high reliability of hardware
components because errors are caused by fatigue, not design.
Does redundancy guarantee such a high reliability with
design errors? in fact, what does redundancy mean in
software terms? Is it the only or best method for
reliability and/or safety in software?
4) Mbdellina an^ Measurement
• Are hardware reliability measures applicable to
software? What relevance do they have to safety?
— Many of the software reliability models attempt to
measure the number of residual errors. Is this reasonable
for reliability? For safety?
— What about other techniques which might be more
relevant to software?
Page 31
— Is it possible to simply apply regular reliability
models to a subset of errors? ie« safety critical errors?
— How should fault-tolerance be modelled and measured?
— Can a practical reliability model be formulated
which covers both softv/are errors and hardware faults? A
safety model?
5) Types of Errors sM SJXSJL ^'gitectibh
™ There are three types of system errors; hardware
errors detected and handled by hardware? software-handled
hardware errors? and software errors. Is this a reasonable
classification? What other types of error classification
are relevant to software safety? Is error classification
dependent upon the perspective and structure imposed on the
system?
— What kinds of errors occur in software? In
specifications? How can safety critical errors be
identified?
— Safety seems to be intimately connected to {perhaps
dependent on) error detection. What are the characteristics
of good error detection facilities? What kinds of error
detection techniques are needed for detecting errors in
design? Coding errors? Bad input data? Hardware errors?
Where should error checking be done? e»g. in application
programs? in special support software? in the operating
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system, in the hardware? Are different types of techniques
more applicable to safety errprs thajn to other errors? what
kinds of language facilities are useful for error checking?
What if there are errprs in the error-detection facilities?
Who checks the checks?.
It is possible to define safety assertions (or
checks) as assertions on critical code, is this useful?
Is it necessary for the program to understand the
semantics of the desired action in order to check for
errors? Are any of the formal techniques for specifying
programming language semantics applicable? What is the
relationship between safety checks and assertions used in
correctness proofs?
Can some classes of assertions and checks be removed
through appropriate testing? What types cannot ever be
removed?
Conclusions
A preliminary definition of software safety and related
terms has been attempted and some questions related to this
area presented. Obviously the answers to all these
questions cannot be determined in the remaining months pf
this project. Only a beginning can bp made. Focus will be
placed on the more basic questions which need to be answered
first and an attempt made to formulate a mpdel with which td
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view the basic concepts.
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